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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE

STATE OF UTAH

WALLACE L. ROSANDER,
Plaintiff-Appellant,

Case

-vs.-

No. 9672

REX A. LARSEN,
Defendant-Respondent.

BRIEF OF DEFENDANT-RESPONDENT
APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT IN
AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Plaintiff owned property on which he was building
a home. Defendant was the contractor, but plaintiff had
reserved the right :
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(a) T'o perform labor in his off hours from his
regular employment, for which defendant had
agreed to credit plaintiff towards the reduction of the total construction cost.
(b) To secure sub-contracts or materials cheaper
than the bid of defendant, in which event the
savings were credited to plaintiff.
While working on the building construction, plaintiff
was injured and filed suit against defendant to recov-er
damages.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
At Pre-trial (R-33) the Honorable Ray Van Cott,
Jr., agreed with defendant that "plaintiff maintained
control over the construction by reserving the right to
order materials and to sublet work on the building; that
he would do his own work in which he would get a discount in the construction cost and, therefore, plaintiff
was in control of the property and cannot be an employee
of himself; also for the further reason that from the admitted facts there is no duty owed to this man by this defendant and there is no showing of any negligence on
the part of the defendant."
The plaintiff's amended complaint was therefore
dismissed.
STATEl\1ENT OF FACTS
The plaintiff was the owner of realty upon which
he was constructing a home.
2
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The defendant had agreed in writing to construct
the said home as general contractor.
I-Iowever, the plaintiff and defendant had further
agreed that plaintiff, when not working in his regular
employment (Depo, 6), personally could perform labor
upon said construction, and receive a credit against the
total contract price for the total time plaintiff personally
performed labor.
In addition, the oral understanding provided that
the plaintiff could secure subcontracts, and materials
at a price lower than the bid of defendant, in which event
the savings effected would be also credited on the total
contract price. (R.13)
On Septernber 4th, 1959, the plaintiff in the absence
of the defendant (Depo. 15), came on the site and perfanned carpenter labor for approximately one half hour
(R. 8). It was approximately 2 o'clock P.M. and daylight
(R. 7). The home was in the stage of construction where
the frame work was up and the sub flooring was installed
(R.13). The roof was not on. (Depo.10).
At the above time and immediately before the accident plaintiff climbed up one of the walls for the purpose
of performing labor on the rafters which were being installed.
Upon reaching the ceiling area, he took hold of a
rafter in an effort to pull himself up. The rafter was
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not fastened and gave way and as a result plaintiff fell.
While falling, he passed through a stairway opening and
fell through it into the basement. (Pre-Trial Order R. 1215).

ARGUMENT
PoiNT

I.

THE LOWER COURT PROPERLY RE.QUIRED PLAINTIFF TO MAKE AN ELECTION.
2 Moore's Federal Practice, 2nd Edition, par. 8.33,
page 170, after having noted that inconsistent pleadings
are allowed, states :
''It should be noted that hypothetical and alternative pleadings are subject to the requirements
of Rule 11 as to honesty in pleading; this is underscored in the last sentence of Rule 8 (e) (2). The
pleader is not at liberty to set forth variant statements of hiJs claim or defense unless he is honestly
,in doubt as to what the eviJdence will show." (emphasis added).
The plaintiff from the outset of this suit showed a
noticeable allergy to divulging that he was the owner of
the property on which he was injured. vVe, therefore,
test the ''honesty in pleading" which is required.
4
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ORIGINAL COMPLAINT.
Par. 2, (R-1)
"On or about the 4th day of September 1959· the
defendant was in possession of certain premises
under construction . . . incident to a contract
between the defendant and the owner of the said
lot. . . . "
Par. 3. (R-1)
"The defendant invited plaintiff to come upon
said lot ... said invitation being issued by defendant incident to business relationships between
plaintiff and defendant. . . . "
The plaintiff's Amended Complaint, filed after the
first Pre-·Trial conference, contains exactly the same allegations in the First and Second Causes of Action (R-2.6,
27). The Third Cause of Action (R-28) which presumably
injects a new theory, the plaintiff's hiding of ownership
continues:
"
. said possession being incident to a contract
between the defendant and the owner of said lot.

"
Not once in the pleadings does it appear that the
plaintiff was indeed the owner of the property.
This lack of candor permeates the entire file.
Defendant served plaintiff with Request for Admissions, (R-4)
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"1.

That each of the following statements are
true:
(a) Plantiff was the owner of the dwelling
being constructed.
''

ANSWER (R-7)
''Plaintiff declines to admit the allegations contained in I (a) on the ground that plaintiff is advised that the owners of the land upon which the
dwelling was being constructed are plaintiff and
his wife and the defendant was in possession of
the dwelling as such, as general contractor. Plaintiff is advised that the question as to the ownership of the said dwelling during ... construction
is a question of law and plaintiff is therefore
unable to answer the same."
The answers were signed by plaintiff's attorney.
Even when the cat was out of the bag, and the obvious had to be faced, plaintiff filed an affidavit, (R-16)
and again, attempting to circumvent the fact of ownership, stated:
'''That he . . . was present . . . on said premises
not as the owner . . . but pursuant to a contract
with defendant ... His presence on said premises
had no connection with the fact that he was the
fee title owner ... and his only object in going to
said premises was to do work on the home pursuant to said contract."
May we be excused for being confused~ The "contract" was the arrangement whereby plaintiff retained
the right to perform labor in order to reduce the con6
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Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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struction costs to the "owner'' (plaintiff) as fully recited
in the Pre-Trial Order (R-13), and in plaintiff's Answers
to Request for Admissions, (R-7-8). How can he, then,
sign an honest affidavit, under oath, that he was working
pursuant to said "contract" yet it had no connection with
the fact that he was the owner~
Moore's Federal Practice, again states, at page 1709 :
"All pleadings, of course, must be clear and understandable."
''The Courts in a number of cases have condemned
pleadings in which alternative or inconsistent
allegations or theories were so intermingled that
the Court was unable to determine what the pleader was getting at."
The Lower Court certainly can demand honest pleadings. An allegation that plaintiff was the owner, but not
the owner, certainly cannot be countenanced, anymore
than an allegation that plaintiff was the driver of a car,
yet was not driving. Defendant is certainly willing to
play the game, but plaintiff ought to be required to at
least stay on the field.
The Lower Court therefore, was justified in compelling plaintiff to elect whether he was alleging that
he was the owner, or whether he was an employee.

7
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PoiNT

II.

REGARDLESS OF T'HE QUESTION OF
ELECTION, DE.FENDANT WAS ENTITLED
TO A DISMISSAL OF ALL THREE CAUSES
OF ACTION ADVANCED BY PLAINTIFF.
Plaintiff's .Amended Complaint advances, it is alleged, three theories. These are difficult to understand,
but in substance are :
FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION:
Plaintiff was an invitee on to his own premises.
SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION:
Plaintiff was on his own premises with the permission of the defendant.
T'HIRD CAUSE OF ACTION:
Plaintiff was an employee in the construction of his
own home.
This however, is a negligence action and we look
first to defendant's contention that plaintiff's .Amended
Complaint and all three causes thereof, fail to state a
claim upon which relief can be granted.
The facts agreed upon by plaintiff's attorney are
recited in the Pre-Trial Order, dated April 26, 1961 (R13)
''. . . on the day in question and for some time
prior to the accident ... the plaintiff had been upon the premises and had been doing some work
there. . . . ''

8
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"At the time of the incident in question the plaintiff was attempting to climb up one of the walls
to assist in fastening the rafters and the rafter
that he was attempting to pull himself up on was
not fastened and as a result he fell, falling through
the stairwell. . . . "

In plaintiff's first two causes of actj or defendant
is charged with the following acts of negligence:
"The defendant w~as negligent in failing to cover
a stairwell on the second story of the aforesaid
building. . . " (R. 27)

The accident did not occur at the stairwell. It occurred on a rafter in the ceiling. The plaintiff was in
flight when he reached the stairwell and while a covering
may have broken his fall, it may also have broken his
back.
"In failing to provide a safe passageway for the
platntiJff."

The accident did not occur in the passageway. The
plaintiff had just climbed a wall before the accident.
"failing to notify plaintiff of dange~rous and un....
safe conditions upon the premises whiJch wene
known to the defendant and h~1s ~agents and employees, or in the exercise of .reasonable care could
have been asce.rtained by them, and fa.iling to
notify the plaintiff of unsafe and dangerous conditions upon the pr.emises."

The defendant owed plaintiff no duty to warn him
of obvious and clearly discernible hazards.
"There is no liability for injuries from dangers
that are obvious, reasonably apparent, or as well
9
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known to the person injured as they are to the
owner or occupant." 38 .AM Jur. Negligence, §97
pg. 757.
''The liability of an owner or occupant ... must be
predicated upon a superior knowledge ... It is
when the perilous instrumentality is known to the
owner or occupant and not known to the person
injured, that a recovery is permitted."
Sherman and Redfiled on Negligence, Vol. 2, Rev.
Ed. Sec. 279, page 690 quotes the following language from
a New York decision:
". . . an employee cannot recover for injuries
received while doing an act to eliminate the cause
of the injury . . . The reason for this is that it
would be manifestly absurd to hold a master to the
duty of providing a safe place, when the very work
in which the servant is engaged makes it unsafe.
If a man is engaged in tearing down a house, he
is constantly exposed to dangers of his own creation."

Gibilterra vs.
115 .Atl. 2nd 553..

Rosen~awr

Homes (1955) 19 N.J. 166,

"The general principle is that the landowner is
under no duty to protect an employee of an independent contractor from the very hazard created
by the doing of the work.''
Sec. 203, 2 Sherman and Redfield on Negligence, Rv.
Ed. pg 473,474:
"The doctrine of safe place ordinarily applies only
to permanent conditions. It has no application
where the place itself is safe~ but is rendered un10
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safe by the negligence of other employees.... It
has no application to a case where the prosecution
of the work itself makes the place and creates the
danger. It has no application where the very work
which the servant is employed to do vs to make
a dangerous place safe."

Landing vs. Town of Fairlee, 112 Vt.127, 22 Atl. (2d)
179:
" 'The safe place doctrine' does not apply where
the work in which the servant is engaged is of such
a nature that its progress constantly produces
changes in the conditions and surroundings, for
in such a situation the hazards arising therefrom
to which the servant is exposed are regarded as
the ordinary dangers of his employment and consequently are assumed by him.''
Furthermore, there can be no duty upon defendant,
as general contractor, to warn plaintiff-owner, of conditions which both are chargeable equally by law with
knowing.
At page 688 Sherman and Redfield, supra the text
states:
''The duty of the owner to the employee of an Independent Contractor is the duty owed by an employer to one of his own employees. In effect this
means that in case of the existence of physical
defects in the owner's premises the owner is
obliged to warn an employee of hidden defects
of which the owner is aware or of which he should
be aware in the exercise of reasonable care.''
11
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An employee of a contractor, is a "business invitee"
of the owner, especially where the owner retains control
over the construction.

Dayton v. Free, 46 Utah 277, 148 P. 408;
Will,iams v. United Men's Shop, 317 Mass. 319, 58
N.E. 2d, 2;

LeVonas v. Acme Paper Go., 184 Md. 16, 40 Atl.
2d, 43.

Shell Oil Go. v. Blanks, (Tenn.) 330 S.W. 2d 569.
20 ALR 2d 853.
The fact that plaintiff retained complete control over
the construction of his own hon1e is evident by his own
testimony (Deposition, pg 19, Line 29 on)

Q. "If I understand then, any time Mr. Larsen
was to, for example, put in the ceiling, he
would have to get three bids from some subcontractors~

A.

"He didn't have to do it, I did, if I wanted,
to see if I could do it cheaper. He already had
his bid, but I would go out and see if I could
find someone to do it cheaper. He already
had his bid, but I would go out and see if I
could find someone to do it cheaper than what
he could do it."

PAGE 20, Line 13:

Q. Did you undertake to subcontract any particular portion of the construction, such as
plumbing, wiring, or anything else 1

12
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

A.

''No. I did get permits for the plumbing and
the electrical.

Q. "In your own name?
A. ''Yes."
Whether plaintiff wants to or not, he must face the
fact that he was the owner and under the above "contract'' in complete control of the construction. If, as he
claims, he was also an employee of the contractor, then
we reach the absurd conclusion that he (owner) owed
himself (employee) a duty to warn himself of dangers
which were obvious in the first place.
The Honorable District Court was justified in dismissing the plaintiff's complaint.
Respectfully submitted,
L. E,. MIDGLEY
Attorney for DefendamtRespondent
415 Boston Building,
Salt Lake City, Utah
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